

【論文】

Hakkō Ichū and *Translatio Imperii*: Race and Imperial Paradigms before and during the Pacific War

Jason M. Morgan

Abstract

Empires require organizing principles. While some, perhaps most, imperial expansions are haphazard, over the long term, ideological justifications for empire are crucial to sustaining and extending imperial reach. In the middle of the twentieth century, two relatively new empires—the American and the Japanese—clashed in Asia and the Pacific. While there is no shortage of research on this clash, there has been surprisingly little comparative investigation into the paradigmatic organizing principles and post hoc ideological justifications that facilitated the Japanese and American imperial expansions which precipitated the Pacific War: the *hakkō ichū* paradigm which overtly animated and informed much of Japan's imperialism, and the *translatio imperii* paradigm which helped justify the ever-westward, Turnerian march of the United States.¹ Both *hakkō ichū* and the Americanized *translatio imperii* were complex, multivalent, highly ideologically fungible conceptualizations of empire. In this essay, I focus on conceptualizations of race within *hakkō ichū* and the American *translatio imperii*, arguing that, while the Americans largely operated under liberalized, mercantiled assumptions of white supremacy in their Pacific forays, the Japanese privileged racial inclusivity and ethnic brotherhood in their imperial paradigm.

Introduction

American filmmaker Frank Capra's 1945 propaganda work, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, is thematized under the concept of *hakkō ichū*, an ancient and obscure idea which saw the Yamato race as forming under the watchful benevolence of the Japanese emperor. In the run-up to the Pacific War, many Japanese authorities had repurposed this long-forgotten notion as a justification for imperial expansion in Asia. American propagandists seized on this ad hoc imperial paradigm. According to Capra, for example, the main reason that Japan had to be resisted was that they were fanatically bent on incorporating the entire world under one roof, as *hakkō ichū* implied.

Little has changed since Capra's time. Mentions of *hakkō ichū* and vague, foreboding gesturing towards Japan's drive for world domination are still staples of historical writing in English about the Pacific War.² It is taken for granted by many who write about Japanese history that Japan was carrying out a mad quest for world domination—an Asia-Pacific version of the Thousand-Year Reich—and that the Allies were justified in stopping this mad expansionism, even at the price of entire metropolitan areas leveled by incendiary and atom bombs.³ For the propagandist Capra as well as for more trained historians and analysts, *hakkō ichū* was the spell under which

¹ On the *translatio imperii* and Frederick Jackson Turner, see Anders Stephanson, "Review of Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, *The Myth of the West: America as the Last Empire* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995)," *The Journal of American History*, vol. 83, no. 4 (Mar., 1997), p. 1393.

² See, e.g., Jeremy A. Yellen, *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), pp. 94-99, and Edwin P. Hoyt, *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict* (New York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 2001), pp. 1-11.

³ For the "justified" thesis, see Marc Gallicchio, *Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World War II* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 210-211. See also D.M. Giangreco, *Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017). Robert H. Pines, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State under George H.W. Bush, typifies the neoconservative view, as does Donald Kagan. See, e.g., Robert H. Pines, "Letter to the Editor," *New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1999, p. 18, and Donald Kagan, "Why America Dropped the Bomb," *Commentary*, vol. 100, no. 3 (Sept., 1995), pp. 17-23.

the Japanese were relentlessly pushing into the Pacific and beyond.

However, while *hakkō ichiū* has frequently been mentioned in histories and propaganda works about Japan, it is a concept that remains almost completely unexamined in non-Japanese literature. This is not due to a shortage of documentation—there is an abundance of primary and secondary material on *hakkō ichiū* in Japanese. A search of the National Diet Library catalog, for instance, yields more than 500 Japanese-language materials on the subject, and there are many more books, articles, essays, pamphlets, and other sources available via other databases and collections. The picture which this array of materials presents of the *hakkō ichiū* paradigm is greatly more complicated than the American propagandists, then and now, have allowed. *Hakkō ichiū*, despite its ubiquity in monographs, remains a strikingly virgin topic of historical inquiry outside of Japan, and for that very reason treatments of the concept languish in oversimplification or outright distortion.

This lack of scholarship in English about *hakkō ichiū* is compounded by another shortcoming. Namely, there are very few scholars who have investigated the intellectual history—the ideological, rhetorical, cultural, and racialist roots—of the Americans' experiment with empire. Paradoxically, the defeated Japanese Empire looms large in Anglo-American scholarship about the Pacific War, but by this same measure the imperial nature of American expansion into Asia and the Pacific has been elided, even erased. With few exceptions—most notably American historians Richard Minear, Gar Alperovitz, William Appleman Williams (1921-1990), and others associated with the New Left's rethinking of American foreign policy in Asia during the Vietnam War⁴—the default understanding of Americans abroad in the Eastern Hemisphere has been, and remains, to take American empire as a historical given, with Washington portrayed as a “sleeping giant” only

reluctantly provoked into fighting and having no imperial pretensions beyond restoring the peace and maintaining freedom of navigation and trade.⁵ One empire is touted as fanatical, in other words, while its rival is normalized as inevitable.

But, just as with the “bounteous absence” of investigations of *hakkō ichiū*, there is a rich—and also richly ignored, by scholars of the Pacific War, at least—literature about the American version of *hakkō ichiū*: *translatio imperii*. To be sure, the *translatio imperii* concept, which has a pedigree stretching back to the fundamentals of Western civilization, was not nearly as explicit in American discourse about empire as was *hakkō ichiū* for Japan. But perhaps this is because *hakkō ichiū* as a principle of overseas expansion was a radically new departure from Japanese history and tradition, and so it was necessary for policymakers to render the paradigm exoterically in order to make it actionable by the military and bureaucrats. The *translatio imperii* concept, by contrast, stretches back at least to Virgil's *Aeneid*, and, by discursive extension, to Io, the Phoenicians, and possibly even earlier. Having been reprised time and again as Mediterranean and other western Eurasian empires rose and fell, and then carried across the Atlantic during the waves of conquest and settlement which reverberated—amplified by enhanced navigation technologies—from the imperial struggles of early modern Europe, the *translatio imperii* paradigm was deeply embedded in—foundational to, in fact—the European overrun of the New World. It was widely accepted that the Europeans had a circular “right of conquest” title to the Americas and beyond, and few along the way seriously questioned this portable justification for empire.⁶ To the Americans in the Pacific in the 1940s, the *translatio imperii* idea was like the water to the goldfish in William Foster Wallace's 2005 Kenyon College graduation speech: so pervasive as to be invisible, so basic as to be able to be conflated with identity.⁷

⁴ An overview of some of the literature is at Alonzo L. Hamby, “Review of Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1995), et al.,” *The Journal of American History*, vol. 84, no. 2 (Sept., 1997), pp. 609-614. See also Richard H. Minear, “The Bomb's American Casualties: Review of Rinjiro Sodei, ed. John Junkerman, *Were We the Enemy? American Survivors of Hiroshima* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998),” *Japan Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1999), pp. 93-95, Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?” *The American Historical Review*, vol. 104, no. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 501-524, and Taesuh Cha, “Republic or Empire: The Genealogy of the Anti-Imperial Tradition in US Politics,” *International Politics*, vol. 56, no. 1 (Feb., 2019), p. 42. See also William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, Along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980).

⁵ In the Hollywood film *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970), Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (1884-1943) is portrayed as having said pensively of the successful raid on Pearl Harbor that he fears the attack has “wakened a sleeping giant”. This line was probably made up for the movie, although it has entered the American historical consciousness all the same. Jonathan Parshall, “Reflecting on Fuchida, or ‘A Tale of Three Whoppers’,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 63, no. 2 (Spring, 2010), p. 138, endnote 4.

⁶ See Jason Morgan, “*Kumazawa Agonistes: The Right of Conquest and the Rise of Democratic Ideology* (Parts I & II),” *Reitaku Review*, vols. 25 & 26 (2019, 2020).

⁷ Jenna Krajeski, “This Is Water,” *The New Yorker*, Sept. 19, 2008

In this essay, I will focus on the most salient aspect (by the 1930s) of both the *hakkō ichiu* and American *translatio imperii* discourse: race. Racial harmony and ethnic assimilation were touchstones of *hakkō ichiu* writing and discussions, especially in the foundation of and justification for the dependency of Manchukuo. The more loosely affiliated sections of the Japanese Empire were also, to a varying degree, conceptually fitted to the metropole using a pastiche of race-and-assimilation ideas organized around the *hakkō ichiu* idea. In the American context, while Washington liberals often eschewed racial hierarchies and portrayed themselves as enlightened alternatives to overtly racist rule by Europeans (and in particular by the English) in Asia, in reality Americans, too, operated on a principle of white supremacy and framed their empire in terms of, at best, benevolent rule by Protestant Anglo-Saxons over less-developed peoples of darker skin tone.⁸ While the *translatio imperii* idea was *ab initio* racially neutral, it underwent a profound change during the conquest of the New World, especially under the influence of slavery in North America. The *translatio imperii* in America morphed, over time, into a racialist paradigm underpinned by a skewed classicism and tendentious reading of history to support white rule on the western side of the Atlantic, and then farther and farther west, out to the eastern seaboard of Eurasia.⁹ When the Japanese and American empires clashed in earnest in late 1941, it was race, more than any other factor, which drove the American conquest of Japan which followed.

Race and *Hakkō Ichiu*

Much of the *hakkō ichiu* writing and other pronouncements was racialist. Much of the underlying premise of *hakkō ichiu* discourse in the twentieth century was racial assimilation under the banner of the Yamato people who had conquered Japan long long ago. Under the proto-emperor Jinmu (ca. 660 BC), latter-day *hakkō ichiu* explanations usually went, the pre-political, primordial disordering of the world had been overcome and a new world order, as it were, brought to bear. Emperor Jinmu formed the platform from which the Yamato race developed thereafter, and this development was later seen as interchangeable with the paradigm of *hakkō ichiu*. In conceptualizing the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the twentieth century, Japanese planners naturally cast their minds back to the Yamato conquest of the Japanese archipelago which laid the foundations for Japanese history thereafter.

Of course, however, race-thinking had undergone extraordinary changes between the time of Jinmu's legendary

shepherding of the Yamato tribes and the violent racialist ideologies which shaped the twentieth century outside of Japan. It must be remembered that it was against this backdrop of trying to achieve racial harmony and imperial buffer zones amid the explicitly racist milieu of Europe and the Americas of the 1930s that the new *hakkō ichiu* discourse was elaborated. Japan was offering a new way of understanding race and national and imperial belonging, and the *hakkō ichiu* discourse was very different from the aggressive, often murderous racisms of white supremacists and other racial chauvinists. According to many *hakkō ichiu* theorists, it was the Emperor, and not the Yamato race, which was the true organizing principle of Japan's expansionism. As the 1938 volume *Hakkō ichiu no seishin* put it:

Imperial Household centralism (*kōshitsu chūshin shugi*) is the vigor of the nation (*kokka no genki ni shite*). While there have accumulated here in perpetuity thousands of years of time, and while there have been repeated vicissitudes in political form, when it comes to the founding spirit of the country and the confidence of the race (*minzoku*), we look not to changes which led from the integration of ritual and government as of old, to the constitutional government of the present, for above all things the alpha and the omega are the centrality of the Imperial Household. The Imperial Household is at the center, and the subjects are arrayed about. Separated from the Imperial Household, there would be no subjects, but all are reconciled in perfect harmony (*nisha konzen toshite yūwa shi*), such that righteousness consists of precisely ruler and subject, affection of father and son. The quintessence of our constitution (*waga kokutai no seika*) lies in receiving these beliefs from our ancestors and handing them down to our descendants, forever unchanged. In truth, we view Imperial Household centralism as the highest morality of the Yamato race (*Yamato minzoku saikō no dōtoku ni shite*) and the foundation of peace of mind and spiritual enlightenment. While it has been ineluctable that what makes up a subject—that which forms this very Yamato race—should have changed over time in concert with the expansion of territory and the development of the race, from the beginning all who have been imperial subjects in unison with the ancient Yamato race have surely (*iyashikumo*) assimilated spiritually (*seishin teki ni dōka shi*) and arrived at Imperial Household centralism, the purport which this volume sets out to advance.¹⁰

⁸ See Thomas Harrison, "Ancient and Modern Imperialism," *Greece & Rome*, vol. 55, no. 1 (2008), pp. 1-22.

⁹ Jaap Verheul, "'A Peculiar National Character': Transatlantic Realignment and the Birth of American Cultural Nationalism after 1815," *European Journal of American Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2012), pp. 1-13.

Although assimilation into the Yamato racialist system was the underlying dynamic of *hakkō ichiu*, the Yamato race is here posited as osmotic, radically open at all times to expansion on a spiritual plane. Those not born into the Yamato race, the text argues, are capable of entering into communion with it by means of solidarity with the Imperial Household.

Here we must pause to note a deep tension within the *hakkō ichiu* concept as redeployed for overseas empire in the 1930s, however. As Shimakawa Masashi points out, by the time of full-scale Japanese imperial expansion the racialist elements of the *hakkō ichiu* discourse had been largely subsumed within appeals to the divinity of the Japanese emperor.¹¹ It was seen as an impossibility that overseas peoples, who obviously did not share in any of the history of the Yamato race, could be racially grafted onto the *hakkō ichiu* concept stemming from Emperor Jimmu. Ironically, *Kokka Shintō*, which had been invented as a counter to Christianity and an organizing principle for the emerging Japanese empire, was later seen to be the obstacle to that empire's more permanent intervention into areas beyond the immediate homelands and annexed territories of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Japan was hamstrung by its own discourse, and what was seen as shoring up the Japanese empire was also what was taken to be keeping it locked into a fixity on the mother country. The Yamato race was an awkward paradigm for empire, and while the spiritual offered a way to modulate Yamatoism and render it expandable to other peoples, the spiritual, too, was closely rooted, in *Kokka Shintō* thinking, with the very concept that imperialists had to transcend in order to effect a coherent expansion into Asia and the Pacific.

And yet, it was nevertheless the spiritual that was seen as being capable of overcoming ethnic divisions and allowing for a gradual incorporation of other races into the Yamatoist-Kokka Shintō paradigm. The place where this was tried out experimentally was the client state of Manchukuo. As Shimakawa notes, in Manchukuo lineage and reverence were

distinguished as a way to help accommodate the non-Yamato status of Manchuria within the *hakkō ichiu* paradigm.¹² As a radical reform of the prevailing Confucianism of the Qing Dynasty, moreover, the *hakkō ichiu* ideal could be modularly expanded out into greater China as an alternative to the quasi-state "religion" of the Chinese literati. Manchukuo was therefore a proving ground for the racially-transcendent Yamato-ism of *hakkō ichiu*, a place where race and religion could be re-imagined so that a pan-Asianist ideal, somewhat conflictedly centered on a 2,600-year Yamato racialist tradition, could be scaled out spiritually and pre-politically (around the Imperial Household) to provide stability to the Asia-Pacific.¹³

This "stability" seems to be what was ultimately intended by discussions of the Kingly Way (*Ōdō*), the imperial-centered, and yet culturally expandable as more generically monarchical, underpinning for the *gozoku kyōwa* ("harmony of the five races") approach which the Japanese authorities adopted in administering Manchukuo.¹⁴ The racial rhetoric of the National Socialists in Germany, for example, was genocidally exclusivist, with Nazi leaders openly vowing to rid first Germany, then Europe, and then the entire world of entire swaths of the population. The Americans, too, were busy developing eugenicist schemes for preserving the purity of Anglo-Saxon Americans.¹⁵ But the Japanese approach was orthogonal to this. It was a given for Japanese imperial planners that the Yamato race would act as the centerpiece of a new order in East Asia, but it was also argued that the Yamato race could be elasticized, perhaps under the power of a retooled *Kokka Shintō*, to include other races which had long suffered under precisely the kind of virulent white rule with which Asia had become so familiar over nearly five centuries of interactions with Europeans.¹⁶

Therefore, although the racialist paradigm of *hakkō ichiu* appears, in retrospect, self-defeating, it should come as no surprise that the architects of the Japanese Empire, from the Kwangtung Army to bureaucrats and public

¹⁰ Utsunomiya Ken, ed., *Hakkō ichiu no seishin* (Tokyo: Yasaka, 1938), "Shōgen," n.p. See also Kuroiwa Akihiko, "'Hakkō ichiu' no tenkai: Teikoku Gikai no shingi keika wo chūshin ni," *Jinja Honchō Sōgō Kenkyūjo Kiyō*, vol. 19 (May, 2014), pp. 117-153.

¹¹ Shimakawa Masashi, "Arahitogami to hakkō ichiu no shisō: Manchukuo kenkoku shinbyō," *Shien*, vol. 43, no. 2 (1983), pp. 51-52

¹² Shimakawa Masashi, "Arahitogami to hakkō ichiu no shisō," op. cit., pp. 53, 57-58

¹³ Shimakawa Masashi, "Arahitogami to hakkō ichiu no shisō," op. cit., pp. 63-64

¹⁴ Shimakawa Masashi, "Arahitogami to hakkō ichiu no shisō," op. cit., p. 65

¹⁵ See Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), Jason McDonald, "Making the World Safe for Eugenics: The Eugenicist Harry H. Laughlin's Encounters with American Internationalism," *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2013), pp. 379-411, and Robert W. Rydell, "The Proximity of the Past: Eugenics in American Culture," *Modern Intellectual History*, vol. 7, no. 3 (2010), pp. 667-678.

¹⁶ See Satomi Kishio, *Shōnen dokuhon: hakkō ichiu: Nihon kokutai ga sekai wo ikka ni suru hanashi* (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1940), esp. Ch. 3, Sec. 2, "Gaikoku no dodai," pp. 89-104. Race was not the only complicating factor: Christianity also gave many under the imperial banner pause. See Takashi Shogimen, "'Another' Patriotism in Early Shōwa Japan (1930-1945)," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 71, no. 1 (Jan., 2010), pp. 139-160.

intellectuals, should have foregrounded race in their imperial architectonics.¹⁷ Race, after all, was one of the main reasons—if not the main reason—for the rise of the Japanese Empire in the first place. Pan-Asianism and anti-colonialism were animating factors in Japanese expansionism from the beginning, with “continental rōnin” and other Asia-minded activists predicating their foreign policy views and behaviors on opposition to the white supremacy of the Americans and Europeans. Racist attitudes within Europe and North America also played a role. Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933), for example, vowed never to return to the United States in the wake of the anti-Japanese immigration legislation there.¹⁸ And Woodrow Wilson’s snub of the Japanese proposal for racial equality stung badly, opening up wounds that had barely scabbed over after the thinly-veiled insult of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908.¹⁹ The Japanese had suffered repeated racial slights at the hands of the Americans, and as time wore on many in Japan, even Quakers such as Nitobe, despaired of achieving equality with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. This groundswell of resistance to what appeared to many in Japan to be patently unfair and even hateful was a major impetus for the imperial foray which Japan undertook in the late nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. By dint of historical necessity as well as ideological underpinning, *hakkō ichiu* was bound to be an anti-racist rejoinder to the imperial mode of Europeans and Americans in the East.

Race and *Translatio Imperii*

Race was certainly a central concern of *hakkō ichiu* discourse and of the Japanese Empire overall, but race has, until recently, remained relatively occulted within the American empire. Victory in World War II seems to have allowed at least two generations of American scholars to deny their country’s racist past in favor of a triumphalist narrative vis-à-vis Japan. This is slowly changing, however. Scholars

who study the Pacific War have increasingly observed that the American engagement with the Japanese has been deeply dyed by racism. John Dower’s *War without Mercy*, for example, and later work by Yuichiro Onishi, Fumiko Sakashita, Yasuhiro Okada, and other historians and researchers, have helped advance our understanding of the role that race has played in the clash over control of the Asia-Pacific in the twentieth century.²⁰ Perhaps no one has tracked the contours of this racism more than American historian Gerald Horne. In *Facing the Rising Sun* and *Race War!*, for example, Horne shows that white supremacy was the dominant dynamic of the Euro-American salient in Asia. And in *Facing the Rising Sun*, Horne explicates how white supremacy overshadowed all other Pacific engagements.²¹ Race, for those who have looked for it, has always been visible in the shadows of the American Colossus.

However, while Dower, Horne, and others have done extensive research on the roots and scope of white supremacy, especially insofar as that principle drove American expansion into the Asia-Pacific, there remains a big gap in our historiographical and conceptual understanding of the rise of modern racism, the roots of Anglo-European incursions into North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean, and the ultimate American takeover of the entire Pacific, including the archipelago of Japan. Even scholars who study race and the Pacific War explicitly almost always miss the deeper roots of race-thinking and how the conceptual drivers of empire, entangled in racism, precipitated so many of the horrors of the 1930s and 40s. These roots are highly ramified, and tracing the history of racism as an idea in Anglo-American and European history is a daunting task. For all this complexity, though, the key to connecting white supremacy and Anglo-Saxon imperialism in the Pacific is the concept of the *translatio imperii*.

The *translatio imperii* idea arose in part out of the cyclical nature of empires. Somewhat akin to the Chinese notion of the

¹⁷ See Sherzod Muminov, “Review of Christopher P. Hanscom and Dennis Washburn, eds., *The Affect of Difference: Representations of Race in East Asian Empire* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016),” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 4 (Dec., 2018), pp. 779-781.

¹⁸ Jessamyn R. Abel, “Ethics and Internationalism in Japanese Education, 1933-45,” *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 546-547. See also Brent M.S. Campney, “Anti-Japanese Sentiment, International Diplomacy, and the Texas Alien Land Law of 1921,” *The Journal of Southern History*, vol. 85, no. 4 (Nov., 2019), pp. 841-878.

¹⁹ Jordan Sand, “Gentlemen’s Agreement, 1908: Fragments for a Pacific History,” *Representations*, vol. 107, no. 1 (Summer, 2009), pp. 91-127.

²⁰ John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1986), Yuichiro Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2013), Yuichiro Onishi and Fumiko Sakashita, eds., *Transpacific Correspondence: Dispatches from Japan’s Black Studies* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019), and Yasuhiro Okada, “Race, Masculinity, and Military Occupation: African American Soldiers’ Encounters with the Japanese at Camp Gifu, 1947-1951,” *The Journal of African American History*, vol. 96, no. 2 (2011).

²¹ Gerald Horne, *Facing the Rising Sun: African Americans, Japan, and the Rise of Afro-Asian Solidarity* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2018), and *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2004)

mandate of heaven, the *translatio imperii* paradigm is a way to ascribe continuity to cycles of seemingly unrelated emergence, thriving, and collapse. The *locus classicus* for the *translatio imperii* idea is Vergil's late first-century BC epic poem *Aeneid*, in which the hero is portrayed as having fled the ruin of Troy and the collapse of Greek civilization more generally and founded a new city—a shining city on seven hills, one might say—in unsullied Italy, in what would later become Rome. Patently a later invention designed to burnish brute Roman force with the sheen of civilizational legitimacy, the *translatio imperii* ideal—which was sometimes rhetorically extended even to include Io and the Phoenicians—was a largely retrospective paradigm. It did not so much guide imperial expansion as encapsulate and arrange already-achieved imperial gains. When Charlemagne, the Hapsburgs, Napoleon, the Slavic chauvinists, and the British imperialists later spoke of the legitimacy and rightfulness of their rule, they often framed their talk, wittingly or not, in terms of the *translatio imperii*.²² *Translatio imperii*, the idea that empires were like phoenixes which could be reborn from the ashes of fallen civilizations, was the attempt to stamp a seal of approval, a seal filigreed with the intricacies of Western culture, to what was usually violent conquest.

However, while the *translatio imperii* ideal was often window dressing for raiding and plunder, it changed radically as Europeans moved out of Europe and began to administer lands populated by those with utterly foreign modes of life, and with a vastly different range of subcutaneous pigmentation than can generally be found in western Eurasia or the Mediterranean basin. The *translatio imperii* idea was essentially non-racial until Europeans left Europe. Even while fighting non-Europeans in Europe, such as the various Muslim empires which besieged Europe from the east and south, the *translatio imperii* idea remained political, and not racialist. However, perhaps the most well-known example of how the *translatio imperii* ideal changed when Europeans encountered

non-Europeans came with the conquest by Spaniards of parts of the New World and the labor and race disputes that roiled the Spanish Empire from the very beginning. While Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) probably explored the far western Atlantic, what he believed to be the East Indies, for the sake of proselytization above all, Columbus' plans, however ideal, quickly devolved into horrors perpetuated for monetary gain.²³ Those who followed Columbus to the New World were often much more concerned for their own pockets than for the Indians' souls. The abundance of native labor and the need to enslave Africans to make up for ruined populations overseas reprogrammed the *translatio imperii* idea, from one of civilizations and politics, even religion, to one of race.

This crisis of the *translatio imperii* crested, in the Spanish context at least, in December of 1515, when Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566), a Spanish landholder who had given up his slaves in the New World due to the cruelties visited upon them by Iberian conquerors, attempted to convince the Spanish king, Ferdinand II of Aragon (1452-1516), and then, after Ferdinand's death, Charles I (1500-1558) (and later Prince Philip II (1527-1598)), of the need to protect the Native peoples of the burgeoning Spanish empire. In 1550-1551, de las Casas debated theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1494-1573) in Valladolid in favor of the humanity of the Natives.²⁴ Although de las Casas was not entirely successful in convincing the Spanish elite of the humanity of the Indians, the very need for such a debate set the tone for the rest of the imperial drive in the Americas. A new question had entered the *translatio imperii* calculus, one that would change the *translatio imperii* concept forever: race.

Race is hardly confined to the *translatio imperii* as it pertains to Spain, however. While the Spanish Empire has faded from the world stage, the American Empire, in fine a franchise operation of the British Empire which spawned it, is now in the throes of a virtual civil war engendered by the consequences of the *translatio imperii* as (unexamined, even

²² See Lisa Hopkins, "What's Actaeon to Aeneas? Marlowe's Mythological Mischief," *Marlowe Studies: An Annual*, vol. 4 (2014), pp. 49-62, Anna N. Klimenko and Vladimir I. Yurtaev, "The 'Moscow as the Third Rome' Concept: Its Nature and Interpretations since the 19th to Early 21st Centuries," *Geopolitica(s)*, vol. 9, no. 2 (2018), pp. 231-251, and Adam Knobler, "Holy Wars, Empires, and the Portability of the Past: The Modern Uses of Medieval Crusades," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 48, no. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 293-325.

²³ On the *translatio imperii* idea in Columbus' actions, see Karen Stolley, "Review of Elise Bartosik-Vélez, *The Legacy of Christopher Columbus in the Americas: New Nations and a Transatlantic Discourse of Empire* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014)," *Early American Literature*, vol. 51, no. 3 (2016), pp. 741-746. For the Protestant variety see David A. Boruchoff, "New Spain, New England, and the New Jerusalem: The 'Translation' of Empire, Faith, and Learning (*translatio imperii, fidei ac scientiae*) in the Colonial Missionary Project," *Early American Literature*, vol. 43, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5-34

²⁴ See Daniel R. Brunstetter, "Sepúlveda, Las Casas, and the Other: Exploring the Tension between Moral Universalism and Alterity," *The Review of Politics*, vol. 72 (2010), pp. 409-435, Lukas Gschwend and Christoph Good, "La conquista española y la idea de los derechos humanos en la obra de Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566)," *Pensamiento Jurídico*, vol. 24 (2009), pp. 39-78, and Edmundo O'Gorman, "La idea antropológica del Padre Las Casas: edad media y modernidad," in Solange Alberro, et al., *Cultura, ideas y mentalidades: Lecturas de 'Historia Mexicana'* (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1992), pp. 1-11.

invisible) racial paradigm. It is this very question of race and empire—although still not articulated as such by most scholars—which is at the heart of the current disputes among American historians over the dichotomy between the historical significance of 1619 and 1620. On the one hand, the 1620ists argue as John Quincy Adams (1767-1848) did in 1802, that the early colonists in North America were very much aware of the racist attitudes of some of their number to Native Americans and to Africans.²⁵ As Adams pointed out and as other historians have affirmed, John Winthrop and his party looked with much disaffection, even dismay, upon the crass racism of the Virginia marauder John Smith and his gang.²⁶ Empire, for the 1620ists, retains the Winthropian ideal of racial neutrality, or even racial progressivism. On the other hand, the 1619ists argue that this too-tidy story of Puritans and Indians overlooks, or even washes out, the very real racial problems which typify the American experiment overall.²⁷ White Americans, the 1619ists counter, have for too long congratulated themselves on their progressive racial attitudes without taking into full account the human costs of the European incursion into the Americas. For the 1619ists, American Empire cannot be separated from racism. While almost never deployed as a term in these debates, what is really at stake is the understanding of the American version of the *translatio imperii*.

Here we must remark the importance of the Civil War in the concept of the *translatio imperii* among the emerging

American empire.²⁸ Many historians today argue that the Civil War was the final pronouncement on the character of the American nation.²⁹ On another reading, though, the Civil War cleared the ground for “scientific racism” or more “progressive” forms of racism to break free from the chattel slavery model, a holdover from early American plantations (North American versions of the *encomienda* which so horrified de las Casas), and establish a new, trans-Atlantic form of Anglo-Saxon, progressivist *translatio imperii* ready to export farther west.³⁰ After the Civil War, the standard narrative goes, Americans had broken the back of plantationist, institutionalized racism, and were therefore poised to bring the blessings of liberty to the Indian tribes west of the Mississippi.

However, a distinction must be made between outlawing slavery and overcoming racism. And a key to this distinction is provided by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes helps us see that the early American venture, especially by the English, was largely commercial, but that bourgeoisie domination of non-Europeans was virtually programmed into this commercial errand into the wilderness.³¹ Hobbes, who had interests in the American colonies himself, intervened in English politics in order to preserve his rights in land and corporate ventures. And economist Thomas Piketty has argued at length that colonialism cannot be separated from the inequalities of the present day.³² Slavery began as a commercial enterprise, after all, a way to solve the labor problem caused by massive

²⁵ Susan Hanssen, “How America’s Adams Family Inherited and Preserved the Pilgrim Mind,” *The Federalist*, Nov. 24, 2020. See also Matthew E. Mason, “Slavery Overshadowed: Congress Debates Prohibiting the Atlantic Slave Trade to the United States, 1806-1807,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, vol. 20 (Spring, 2000), pp. 59-81.

²⁶ Rebecca Mansour, “Why We Chose 1620 as the Year of ‘Our True Founding’, Not 1619,” *Breitbart*, Nov. 26, 2020, citing John Quincy Adams, “Oration at Plymouth,” Dec. 22, 1802 <http://www.dailyrepublican.com/plymouth-orate.html>. See also Michael A. McDonnell, “Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World,” *Clio*, vol. 36, no. 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 434-439.

²⁷ See, e.g., Peter W. Wood, *1620: A Critical Response to the 1619 Project* (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2020), Phillip W. Magness, *The 1619 Project: A Critique* (Great Barrington, MA: American Institute for Economic Research, 2020), Nikole Hannah-Jones, et al., “The 1619 Project,” *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 14, 2019, and Jason Morgan, “Amerika ni okeru rekishi ninshiki to bōryoku teki kakumei to no tsunagari,” *Rekishi Ninshiki Mondai Kenkyū*, vol. 8 (Mar., 2021), pp. 89-104.

²⁸ On the Civil War and American empire, see, passim, John Fabian Witt, “Law and War in American History,” *The American Historical Review*, vol. 115, no. 3 (Jun., 2010), pp. 768-778.

²⁹ See, e.g., Michael E. Woods, “What Twenty-First-Century Historians Have Said about the Causes of Disunion: A Civil War Sesquicentennial Review of the Recent Literature,” *The Journal of American History*, vol. 99, no. 2 (Sept., 2012), pp. 415-439, Diana J. Schaub, “Review of Allen C. Guelzo, *Redeeming the Great Emancipator* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016),” *Society*, vol. 54, no. 2 (Apr., 2017), pp. 196-198, and Wilfred M. McClay, *Land of Hope: An Invitation to the Great American Story* (New York: Encounter Books, 2019), and Brion McClanahan, “Guelzo’s Reconstruction Gaffe,” *The Abbeville Blog*, Sept. 19, 2019.

³⁰ See, e.g., Charles Wentworth Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867*, 2 vols. (London: MacMillan, 1868), cited in Jörn Leonhard, “Introduction: The *Longue Durée* of Empire: Toward a Comparative Semantics of a Key Concept in Modern European History,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, vol. 8, iss. 1 (Summer, 2013), p. 20.

³¹ Christopher N. Warren, “Hobbes’s Thucydides and the Colonial Law of Nations,” *The Seventeenth Century*, vol. 24, no. 2 (Oct., 2009), pp. 260-286

³² Thomas Piketty, tr. Arthur Goldhammer, *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020), and *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014)

casualties among Natives forced to work on *encomienda*.³³ As de las Casas knew too well, it was the commercial aspect of the imperial project which was causing untold suffering for Native peoples. On the crest of this commercial swell into the Americas, Indian slavery, by one name or another, continued well into the twentieth century.³⁴ Outlawing slavery was not tantamount to eradicating racism from the *translatio imperii*.

It must also be borne in mind that later, after the initial forays of the Europeans into the New World, slavery reversed polarity. It was no longer that Indians, or the Africans who were brought to the New World to take their place when disease and maltreatment had reduced their labor potential, were enslaved because they were available, but because they were Indian, or, especially, African. It was slavery, and the *translatio imperii* more generally, that created racism, and not the other way around. The victors in the Civil War did not overcome this basic view, but merely used the Civil War as a pretense for expanding their empire throughout North America. In this regard, for example, the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) as prelude to the Civil War is much more important than commonly realized. Whether Mexicans (largely Peninsulars, to be sure, but with many mestizo or Native conscripts in the ranks) or American Indian tribes, the idea was the progressive transfer of Anglo-Saxon civilization west.³⁵ The *translatio imperii* could shed its overt connection to chattel slavery and yet still maintain, or even strengthen, its racist character. Americans did not, on this reading, leave behind racism at the Appomattox Courthouse in April of 1865—they simply gave up slave-owning for more dynamic racial imperialism on the Plains. For historian Paul A. Kramer, this juggernaut of racist imperialism found its most flagrant expression in the Americans' backhanded appropriation of the Philippines, but there are many other examples—from Hawai'i, the Great Plains, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere—to support the general thesis of *translatio imperii* as, by the nineteenth century, a predominantly racist concept masquerading as

civilizational progress and enlightenment.³⁶

The Clash: *Translatio Imperii* vs. *Hakkō Ichiu*

It was under these conditions that the paradigms of *translatio imperii* and *hakkō ichiu* clashed in the Pacific in the 1930s. There was a commercial element, to be sure. As Hobbes had understood, and as Adam Smith (1723-1790) had advocated, commerce is potentially more powerful than states. The American practice of sugar, banana, and pineapple mercantilism in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Hawai'i, and the Philippines belied the partially commercial nature of the American enterprise. This, coupled with Japan's experiment with autarky in the form of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the United States' socialization of the national economy under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, lend credence to the interpretation of the Pacific War as at least in part economic. And then there was the anti-imperialist strain of American politics, visible from the earliest stirrings of colonial independence. Many worried at the very beginning of the American experiment, for example, that the Hamiltonian imperialists would win out over the Jefferson agrarians and destroy the georgic *translatio imperii* inherited from England.³⁷ Their fears were well founded. Degeneracy theory and rampant Whiggism, too, left their mark on the *translatio imperii* idea, until somehow manifest destiny appeared to have traded places with a line of thought once taken up by Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), and Marsiglio of Padua (ca. 1275-1342).³⁸ It should be noted that the *translatio imperii*, while inherently racist by the time it had been used to condone the genocides and slave empires which marked North American history after the arrival of Europeans, was not exclusively racist for all that.

But concealed within the ostensibly money-making adventurism and anti-imperialist agrarian strains of ostensibly non-racist Americanism were deep-seated prejudices and

³³ The broader commercial reinterpretation of the *translatio imperii* is readily apparent in writings from early Colonial America. See, e.g., Scott Breuninger, "'Social Gravity' and the *Translatio* Tradition in Early American Theories of Empire," *Southern Quarterly*, vol. 43, no. 4 (Summer, 2006), esp. pp. 70-82.

³⁴ Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America* (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016)

³⁵ See, e.g., Larry Kutchin, "Timothy Dwight's Anglo-American Georgic: *Greenfield Hill* and the Rise of United States Imperialism," *Studies in the Literary Imagination*, vol. 33, no. 2 (Fall, 2000), pp. 109-128.

³⁶ Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910," *The Journal of American History*, vol. 88, no. 4 (Mar., 2002), pp. 1315-1353.

³⁷ Stephen Adams, "Philip Freneau's Summa of American Exceptionalism: 'The Rising Glory of America' without Brackenridge," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, vol. 55, no. 4 (Winter, 2013), p. 390

³⁸ See Phillip H. Round, "The Discursive Origins of the American Revolution: The Case of Nathaniel Rogers, Merchant of Boston," *Early American Literature*, vol. 30, no. 3 (1995). See also Joshua Matthews, "The *Divine Comedy* as an American Civil War Epic," *The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall, 2013), pp. 315-337, Cary J. Nederman, "Empire and the Historiography of European

assumptions about race. The *translatio imperii* dynamic had, over time and in the cauldron of American Anglo-Saxon imperial formation, taken on an indelible white supremacist taint. This is the scent that Gerald Horne picks up when he notes the affinity that many Black Americans felt for Japan, for instance. After Japan's defeat of a virulently racist imperial power, Russia, in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian menace became, for many Americans, the Yellow Peril, and the meaning of "east" shifted from St. Petersburg and Moscow to Tokyo. The Americans became, in large part unwittingly, obsessed with controlling the emergence of a non-Anglo-Saxon group beyond the borders of the United States. The bastard grandson of Albion was not just Jim Crow, in other words, but also Uncle Sam, rolling up his sleeves to pummel a non-white "peril" emanating from Japan. From anti-Asian legislation in California to, after Pearl Harbor, the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans in concentration camps, the Americans made it abundantly clear that they were not prepared to view Asians as equals. In remembering Pearl Harbor, Americans forgot Jamestown, lynchings, and Wounded Knee.

It was as a reaction, in large part, to this racialism that the Japanese side developed its own racial theories, rooted in Yamato racial stability but also, paradoxically, open to integration with other races. The double-edged nature of race in *hakkō ichiu* is a function of the racial subtext of the *translatio imperii* dynamic driving American imperialists into the western Pacific. When the Americans triumphed over Japan in 1945, they pretended to have done so in the name of freedom and democracy. However, the role that *hakkō ichiu* played in justifying, in the eyes of the Americans, their imperial victory revealed, in the very act of concealing, the deep racial subtext of the Pacific War.³⁹ *Translatio imperii*, tinged with racism, had overcome *hakkō ichiu*, which Japanese planners had endeavored to distance from Yamato-

centrism.⁴⁰ In overcoming Japanese "fascism," the Americans had engaged in the final act of whitewashing their own racist takeover of the Atlantic, North America, and then the entire Pacific. The *translatio imperii* had come full circle, back east, but this time in the hands of Anglo-Saxon supremacy.

Conclusion

In the 1930s and 1940s, the United States of America and the Empire of Japan squared off, and then fought a devastating war, over control of the Pacific and East and Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of that war, the American side was able to write, and then rewrite, the war's history in order to justify the American imperialist juggernaut.⁴¹ The Japanese side was branded as racist and aggressively imperialist, and echoes of this revisionism can still be seen in American scholars' unquestioning acceptance of propaganda about the *hakkō ichiu*.⁴² Japan is marked as a racist aggressor in Asia and the Pacific, and the United States is, by this same measure, conveniently absolved of its own racist doctrine, *translatio imperii*, which was deployed, both tacitly and overtly, to justify Protestant Anglo-Saxon America's half-genocide of the Yamato race in the 1940s.

However, now that the American empire is also fading away, buried and forgotten truths are again emerging, as wreckage from a receding tide. This historical moment presents an opportunity to revisit the past, in particular the imperial clash between the Japanese and American empires over the Asia-Pacific. As the triumphalist narratives of American exceptionalism wear thin and fray, it becomes easier to see the self-serving nature of these narratives, and also the racialist discourse they were meant to conceal.⁴³ *Hakkō ichiu* should be remembered as a complex, fundamentally anti-racist reimagining of the Japanese past in order to broker imperial expansion, much of it defensively anti-racist, into Asia and the

Political Thought: Marsiglio of Padua, Nicholas of Cusa, and the Medieval/Modern Divide," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 66, no. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 1-15, Richard M. Gamble, "'The Last and Brightest Empire of Time': Timothy Dwight and America as Voegelin's 'Authoritative Present', 1771-1787," *Humanitas*, vol. 20, nos. 1 & 2 (2007), pp. 13-35, and William Levine, "Collins, Thomson, and the Whig Progress of Liberty," *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 34, no. 2 (Summer, 1994).

³⁹ See Komori Yoshimine, "Shintō no sekai shūkyō teki seikaku: seikyō bunri gensoku no kongen teki tankyū no tame ni," *Kenpō Ronsō*, no.18 (Dec., 2011), pp. 131-157. See also Kawai Kazushige, *Kenpō kyū jō to Yasukuni jinja* (Tokyo: Kōyō Shuppansha, 2007), pp. 145-165. The triumphalist narrative remains standard among white liberals. See, e.g., Sven Saaler, "Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, vol. 14, iss. 20, no. 7 (Oct. 15, 2016), pp. 1-17

⁴⁰ See also Gordon H. Chang, "Whose 'Barbarism'? Whose 'Treachery'? Race and Civilization in the Unknown United States-Korea War of 1871," *The Journal of American History*, vol. 89, no. 4 (Mar., 2003), pp. 1331-1364.

⁴¹ On *hakkō ichiu* under the postwar American imperial gaze, see Kuroiwa Akihiko, "Senryōka no ametsuchi no motohashira: 'Shintō shirei' to 'hakkō ichiu' no goji," *Shintō Shūkyō*, vol. 233 (Jan., 2015), pp. 25-50.

⁴² See Yokomizo Mitsuteru, "Tōkyō saiban ni okeru 'hakkō ichiu'," *Nihon Bunka*, vol. 1092 (May, 2015), pp. 1-56.

⁴³ Margaret Werry, "'The Greatest Show on Earth': Political Spectacle, Spectacular Politics, and the American Pacific," *Theatre Journal*, vol. 57, no. 3 (Oct., 2005), pp. 355-382

Pacific. The American *translatio imperii*, by contrast, should be remembered as an ineluctably racist paradigm deployed to justify the Anglo-Saxon takeover of half the planet, an extension of the first forays of Europeans into the New World some five centuries before.

Bibliography

- Abel, Jessamyn R. 2018. "Ethics and Internationalism in Japanese Education, 1933-45". *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 52, no. 2.
- Adams, John Quincy. 1802. "Oration at Plymouth".
- Adams, Stephen. 2013. "Philip Freneau's Summa of American Exceptionalism: 'The Rising Glory of America' without Brackenridge". *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, vol. 55, no. 4.
- Adelman, Jeremy. 2015. "Mimesis and Rivalry: European Empires and Global Regimes". *Journal of Global History*, vol. 10.
- Anzoátegui, Víctor Tau. 2016. "El Gobierno del Perú de Juan de Matienzo: En la senda del humanism jurídico". In *El Jurista en el Nuevo Mundo: Pensamiento, Doctrina, Mentalidad*. Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory.
- Aquino, Jorge A. 2015. "Historia, poder e ideología: La ideología racial como producción del sistema-mundo capitalista moderno". *Horizontes Decoloniales/Decolonial Horizons*, vol. 1.
- Boruchoff, David A. 2008. "New Spain, New England, and the New Jerusalem: The 'Translation' of Empire, Faith, and Learning (*translatio imperii, fidei ac scientiae*) in the Colonial Missionary Project". *Early American Literature*, vol. 43, no. 1.
- Breuninger, Scott. 2006. "'Social Gravity' and the Translatio Tradition in Early American Theories of Empire". *Southern Quarterly*, vol. 43, no. 4.
- Brunstetter, Daniel R. 2010. "Sepúlveda, Las Casas, and the Other: Exploring the Tension between Moral Universalism and Alterity". *The Review of Politics*, vol. 72.
- Campney, Brent M.S. 2019. "Anti-Japanese Sentiment, International Diplomacy, and the Texas Alien Land Law of 1921". *The Journal of Southern History*, vol. 85, no. 4.
- Cha, Taesuh. 2019. "Republic or Empire: The Genealogy of the Anti-Imperial Tradition in US Politics". *International Politics*, vol. 56, no. 1.
- Chang, Gordon H. 2003. "Whose 'Barbarism'? Whose 'Treachery'? Race and Civilization in the Unknown United States-Korea War of 1871". *The Journal of American History*, vol. 89, no. 4.
- Dilke, Charles Wentworth. 1868. *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867*, 2 vols. London: MacMillan.
- Dower, John. 1986. *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Gallicchio, Marc. 2020. *Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World War II* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gschwend, Lukas and Christoph Good. 2009. "La conquista española y la idea de los derechos humanos en la obra de Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566)". *Pensamiento Jurídico*, vol. 24.
- Hanssen, Susan. 2020. "How America's Adams Family Inherited and Preserved the Pilgrim Mind". *The Federalist*, Nov. 24.
- Hell, Julia. 2009. "Katechon: Carl Schmitt's Imperial Theology and the Ruins of the Future". *The Germanic Review*, vol. 84, no. 4.
- Horne, Gerald. 2004. *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- . 2018. *Facing the Rising Sun: African Americans, Japan, and the Rise of Afro-Asian Solidarity*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. 2001. *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict*. New York, NY: Cooper Square Press.
- Gamble, Richard M. 2007. "'The Last and Brightest Empire of Time': Timothy Dwight and America as Voegelin's 'Authoritative Present', 1771-1787". *Humanitas*, vol. 20, nos. 1 & 2.
- Giangreco, D.M. 2017. *Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Hamby, Alonzo L. 1997. "Review of Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1995), et al." *The Journal of American History*, vol. 84, no. 2.
- Hannah-Jones, Nikole, et al. 2019. "The 1619 Project". *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 14.
- Harrison, Thomas. 2008. "Ancient and Modern Imperialism". *Greece & Rome*, vol. 55, no. 1.
- Hopkins, Lisa. 2014. "What's Actaeon to Aeneas? Marlowe's Mythological Mischief". *Marlowe Studies: An Annual*, vol. 4.
- Kagan, Donald. 1995. "Why America Dropped the Bomb". *Commentary*, vol. 100, no. 3.
- Kawai Kazushige. 2007. *Kenpō kyū jō to Yasukuni jinja*. Tokyo: Kōyō Shuppansha.
- Kitamura Yoshikazu. 1989. "TRANSLATIO IMPERII ni tsuite: Chūgoku shisōshi kara mita Yōroppa kōteiken". *Akita Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kenkyū Kiyō*, vol. 40.
- Klimenko, Anna N. and Vladimir I. Yurtaev. 2018. "The 'Moscow as the Third Rome' Concept: Its Nature and Interpretations since the 19th to Early 21st Centuries". *Geopolitica(s)*, vol. 9, no. 2.
- Knobler, Adam. 2006. "Holy Wars, Empires, and the Portability of the Past: The Modern Uses of Medieval Crusades". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 48, no. 2.
- Komori Yoshimine. 2011. "Shintō no sekai shūkyō teki seikaku: seikyō bunri gensoku no kongen teki tankyū no tame ni". *Kenpō Ronsō*, no.18.
- Krajleski, Jenna. 2008. "This Is Water". *The New Yorker*, Sept. 19.
- Kramer, Paul A. 2002. "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910". *The Journal of American History*, vol. 88, no. 4.
- Kühl, Stefan. 1994. *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kuroiwa Akihiko. 2014. "'Hakkō ichiu' no tenkai: Teikoku Gikai no shingi keika wo chūshin ni". *Jinja Honchō Sōgō Kenkyūjo Kiyō*, vol. 19.
- . 2015. "Senryōka no ametsuchi no motohashira: 'Shintō shirei' to 'hakkō ichiu' no goji". *Shintō Shūkyō*, vol. 233.
- . 2016. "'Hakkō ichiu' no guzōka: Haseiden kara ametsuchi no motohashira e". *Shintō Shūkyō*, vol. 241.
- Kutchen, Larry. 2000. "Timothy Dwight's Anglo-American Georgic: Greenfield Hill and the Rise of United States Imperialism". *Studies in the Literary Imagination*, vol. 33, no. 2.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. 1999. "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?" *The American Historical Review*, vol. 104, no. 2.
- Leonhard, Jörn. 2013. "Introduction: The Longue Durée of Empire: Toward a Comparative Semantics of a Key Concept in Modern European History". *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, vol. 8, iss. 1.
- Levine, William. 1994. "Collins, Thomson, and the Whig Progress of Liberty". *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 34, no. 2.
- Magness, Phillip W. 2020. *The 1619 Project: A Critique*. Great Barrington, MA: American Institute for Economic Research.
- Mansour, Rebecca. 2020. "Why We Chose 1620 as the Year of 'Our True Founding', Not 1619". *Breitbart*, Nov. 26.
- Mason, Matthew E. 2000. "Slavery Overshadowed: Congress Debates Prohibiting the Atlantic Slave Trade to the United States, 1806-1807". *Journal of the Early Republic*, vol. 20.
- Matthews, Joshua. 2013. "The Divine Comedy as an American Civil War Epic". *The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists*, vol. 1, no. 2.
- Matthiessen, Sven. 2019. "Re-Orienting the Philippines: The KALIBAPI Party and the Application of Japanese Pan-Asianism, 1942-45". *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 53, no. 2.
- McClanahan, Brion. 2019. "Guelzo's Reconstruction Gaffe". *The Abbeville Blog*, Sept. 19.
- McClay, Wilfred M. 2019. *Land of Hope: An Invitation to the Great American Story*. New York: Encounter Books.
- McDonald, Jason. 2013. "Making the World Safe for Eugenics: The Eugenicist Harry H. Laughlin's Encounters with American Internationalism". *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, vol. 12, no. 3.

- McDonnell, Michael A. 2007. "Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World". *Clio*, vol. 36, no. 3.
- Minear, Richard H. 1999. "The Bomb's American Casualties: Review of Rinjiro Sodei, ed. John Junkerman, *Were We the Enemy? American Survivors of Hiroshima* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998)". *Japan Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1.
- Morgan, Jason. 2019. "Kumazawa Agonistes: The Right of Conquest and the Rise of Democratic Ideology (Part I)". *Reitaku Review*, vol. 25.
- . 2020. "Kumazawa Agonistes: The Right of Conquest and the Rise of Democratic Ideology (Part II)". *Reitaku Review*, vol. 26.
- . 2021. "Amerika ni okeru rekishi ninshiki to bōryoku teki kakumei to no tsunagari". *Rekishi Ninshiki Mondai Kenkyū*, vol. 8.
- Muminov, Sherzod. 2018. "Review of Christopher P. Hanscom and Dennis Washburn, eds., *The Affect of Difference: Representations of Race in East Asian Empire* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016)". *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 4.
- Nederman, Cary J. 2005. "Empire and the Historiography of European Political Thought: Marsiglio of Padua, Nicholas of Cusa, and the Medieval/Modern Divide". *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 66, no. 1.
- O'Gorman, Edmundo. 1992. "La idea antropológica del Padre Las Casas: edad media y modernidad". In Solange Alberro, et al., *Cultura, ideas y mentalidades: Lecturas de 'Historia Mexicana'*. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico.
- Okada, Yasuhiro. 2011. "Race, Masculinity, and Military Occupation: African American Soldiers' Encounters with the Japanese at Camp Gifu, 1947-1951". *The Journal of African American History*, vol. 96, no. 2.
- Onishi, Yuichiro. 2013. *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Onishi, Yuichiro and Fumiko Sakashita, eds. 2019. *Transpacific Correspondence: Dispatches from Japan's Black Studies*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Parshall, Jonathan. 2010. "Reflecting on Fuchida, or 'A Tale of Three Whoppers'". *Naval War College Review*, vol. 63, no. 2.
- Piketty, Thomas, tr. Arthur Goldhammer. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- . 2020. *Capital and Ideology*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Pines, Robert H. 1999. "Letter to the Editor". *New York Times*, Jan. 1.
- Pocock, J.G.A. 1975. *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Reséndez, Andrés. 2016. *The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America*. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Round, Phillip H. 1995. "The Discursive Origins of the American Revolution: The Case of Nathaniel Rogers, Merchant of Boston". *Early American Literature*, vol. 30, no. 3.
- Rydell, Robert W. 2010. "The Proximity of the Past: Eugenics in American Culture". *Modern Intellectual History*, vol. 7, no. 3.
- Saaler, Sven. 2016. "Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan". *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, vol. 14, iss. 20, no. 7.
- Sand, Jordan. 2009. "Gentlemen's Agreement, 1908: Fragments for a Pacific History". *Representations*, vol. 107, no. 1.
- Satomi Kishio. 1940. *Shōnen dokuhon: hakkō ichū: Nihon kokutai ga sekai wo ikka ni suru hanashi*. Tokyo: Kinseisha.
- Schaub, Diana J. 2017. "Review of Allen C. Guelzo, *Redeeming the Great Emancipator* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)". *Society*, vol. 54, no. 2.
- Schmelzer, Felix K. E. 2014. "La utopia científica del Siglo de Oro: el Estado ideal como tópico de la prosa científica y técnica en castellano (1526-1613)". *RILCE*, vol. 30, no. 1.
- Shimakawa Masashi. 1983. "Arahitogami to hakkō ichū no shisō: Manchukuo kenkoku shinbyō". *Shien*, vol. 43, no. 2.
- Shogimen, Takashi. 2010. "Another' Patriotism in Early Shōwa Japan (1930-1945)". *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 71, no. 1.

- Stephanson, Anders. 1997. "Review of Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, *The Myth of the West: America as the Last Empire* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995)". *The Journal of American History*, vol. 83, no. 4.
- Stolley, Karen. 2016. "Review of Elise Bartosik-Vélez, *The Legacy of Christopher Columbus in the Americas: New Nations and a Transatlantic Discourse of Empire* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014)". *Early American Literature*, vol. 51, no. 3.
- Szpilman, Christopher W. A. 2013. "Kanokogi Kazunobu: Pioneer of Platonic Fascism and Imperial Pan-Asianism". *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 68, no. 2.
- Teed, Paul. E. 2001. "The Politics of Sectional Memory: Theodore Parker and the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*, 1847-1850". *Journal of the Early Republic*, vol. 21, no. 2.
- Torres-Murciano, Antonio Rio. 2016. "Polifemo en Yucatán: Variaciones sobre un episodio de la Eneida an la épica cortesiana del Quinientos". *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica, Estudios Latinos*, vol. 36, no. 1.
- Utsunomiya Ken, ed. 1938. *Hakkō ichiu no seishin*. Tokyo: Yasaka.
- Verheul, Jaap. 2012. "'A Peculiar National Character': Transatlantic Realignment and the Birth of American Cultural Nationalism after 1815". *European Journal of American Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2.
- Warren, Christopher N. 2009. "Hobbes's Thucydides and the Colonial Law of Nations". *The Seventeenth Century*, vol. 24, no. 2.
- Werry, Margaret. 2005. "'The Greatest Show on Earth': Political Spectacle, Spectacular Politics, and the American Pacific". *Theatre Journal*, vol. 57, no. 3.
- Williams, William Appleman. 1980. *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, Along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, Diana de Armas. 2000. "Cervantes and the Indies". *Philosophy and Literature*, vol. 24, no. 2.
- Witt, John Fabian. 2010. "Law and War in American History". *The American Historical Review*, vol. 115, no. 3.
- Wood, Peter W. 2020. *1620: A Critical Response to the 1619 Project*. New York, NY: Encounter Books.
- Woods, Michael E. 2021. "What Twenty-First-Century Historians Have Said about the Causes of Disunion: A Civil War Sesquicentennial Review of the Recent Literature". *The Journal of American History*, vol. 99, no. 2.
- Yamashita Hisao. 2010. "Tanaka Kōji cho 'Motoori Norinaga no Dai TōA sensō'". *Nihon Bungaku*, vol. 59, no. 3.
- Yamazaki, Takashi. 2019. "Commentario. Nishida Kitarō y 'El principio del nuevo orden mundial'". *Geopolítica(s)*, vol. 10, no. 2.
- Yellen, Jeremy A. 2019. *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yokomizo Mitsuteru. 2015. "Tōkyō saiban ni okeru 'hakkō ichiu'". *Nihon Bunka*, vol. 1092.