

## On *Have* Constructions: Shared Characteristics

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**Keywords:** *have* construction, reflexivity, localist, semantic role

### Abstract

Contrary to several previous studies claiming that *have* assigns no semantic role and has little or no lexical meaning, the present study attempts to argue for the inclusion of *have* in the category of localist verbs and for the existence of the same lexical meaning in the *have* constructions. Specifically, the present study argues that the five *have* constructions dealt with here share two characteristics: (i) assigning a localist semantic role or roles to their subject argument and (ii) encoding reflexivity. The reflexivity associated with eventive causative *have*, in particular, can only be clarified within a localist approach (Inoue (1995)). One of the underlying proposals will be that the five constructions are manifestations of one *have* (cf. Ritter and Rosen (1993, 1997)).

### 1. Introduction

Localist theories (e.g. Anderson (1971, 2006)) assume that basically the same apparatuses can be employed both for the analysis of spatial location and motion, and for the analysis of states of affairs that are not of a spatial nature. Jackendoff's (1983: 188) Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH), which assumes such semantic roles as Location, Source, and Goal, is one instantiation of localist ideas. In his framework, verbs like *lose* and *receive* can have representations like the following:

- (1) a. Beth lost the doll.  
b. [GO<sub>Poss</sub> ([DOLL], [FROM<sub>Poss</sub> ([BETH])])] ]
- (2) a. Beth received the doll.  
b. [GO<sub>Poss</sub> ([DOLL], [TO<sub>Poss</sub> ([BETH])])] ]

(Jackendoff (1983: 192), with slight modifications)

The employment of FROM or TO is the only difference between the representations in (1b) and (2b). The surface subject of *lose* bears the Source role and is represented as the argument of the function FROM in the representation. The surface subject of *receive* bears the Goal role and is represented as the argument of the function TO in the representation. Both representations assign the Theme role to the first argument of the function GO. The arguments are mapped to

syntactic structure, and the subscript Poss means that the functions apply in the semantic field of possession.

Within a localist approach, the difference in acceptability in (3), where the adverb *intentionally* appears, can be accounted for in the following way (Nakau (1994), Takeuchi (2019)): a Source argument is conceptually compatible with being agentive, since agentive arguments can be regarded as the intentional source of the activity that the predicate refers to (e.g. Gruber (1967)). Thus, the subject argument of *lose* can be agentive, and sentence (3a) is licensed. On the other hand, Goal being the exact contrary to Source, a Goal argument is *not* conceptually compatible with being agentive. The subject argument of *receive* cannot thus be agentive, and sentence (3b) is not licensed.<sup>1</sup>

- (3) a. John lost the game intentionally. (Gruber (1965/1976: 159))  
 b. \* John received the book from Bill intentionally. (Gruber (1965/1976: 157))

Another verb or predicate that can be properly explained in a localist approach is possessive. The possessor in possessive verbs in general is often assumed to bear the semantic role of Location. This hypothesis is sometimes called the Possessor-as-Location Hypothesis (PAL hypothesis) (e.g. Tham (2009)). The idea in the PAL hypothesis dates back to, for example, Benveniste (1966) and is stated like the following:

- (4) *Avoir* n'est rien autre qu'un *être+à* inversé. (Benveniste (1966: 197))  
 'To *have* is nothing other than an inverse to *be-to*' (Benveniste (1971: 171))

From a localist point of view, statement (4) can be interpreted as the claim that the complement of *to* and the subject argument of *have* bear the same semantic role.

One of the possessive verbs available in English is *have*. Sentence (5a), an instance of possessive *have*, has sometimes been equated with a sentence like (5b), meaning that the subject argument of sentence (5a) has sometimes been equated with the possessor argument in (5b), which bears Location (e.g. Jackendoff (2007: 213)).

- (5) a. John has a house.  
 b. The house belongs to John.

The five *have* constructions that we deal with here are (i) possessive *have* (6a), (ii) existential *have* (6b), (iii) stative causative *have* (6c), (iv) experiencer *have* (6d), and (v) eventive causative *have* (6e):

- (6) a. John has a house.  
 b. She<sub>i</sub> has a hole in her<sub>i</sub> shoe.  
 c. This whole thing has me so rattled. (Iron Fist 1-2, 23:06 left)

<sup>1</sup> The discussion here is based on Gruber's judgement. For the behavior of *receive*, see, for example, McIntyre (2005: 410).

- d. She<sub>i</sub> had her<sub>i</sub> camera confiscated by the police. (Washio (1997: 51))  
e. My boss had me check my work. (McIntyre (2006: 189))

The present study argues that not only the subject argument of possessive *have* but also that of the other four *have* constructions bears a localist semantic role or roles. In other words, I claim that the verb *have* should be included in the category of localist verbs or predicates, regardless of the construction in which it appears.

Another characteristic that the five *have* constructions share is reflexivity. For example, it has been well known that existential *have* encodes a reflexive relation between the subject and an element within the PP (e.g. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), Harley (1997), McIntyre (2006), Nakau (1991), Takeuchi (2013, 2015)). Sentence (7) can only contain in its PP a pronoun referring back to the subject referent:

- (7) The box<sub>i</sub> has books in {it<sub>i</sub> / \*them / \*the room}. (Nakau (1991: 337))

The other four *have* constructions, the present study claims, encode reflexivity as well. In particular, the reflexivity associated with eventive causative *have* can best be clarified within a localist approach (Inoue (1995)). This is another reason for arguing for the inclusion of *have* in the category of localist verbs.

The term “reflexivity” is a cover term for the relation between the subject argument of *have* and its complement, which can be divided into the following three subclasses: (i) the referential dependency between the subject and an element somewhere in the complement, (ii) the subject argument being affected by the event denoted by the complement, which is often guaranteed and/or triggered by the appearance of a pronoun coreferential with the subject, and (iii) the subject argument bearing both Source and Goal simultaneously.

The reflexivity encoded by the *have* constructions is conceptual, meaning that there is no need for a formal element establishing it to appear in the complement (cf. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), McIntyre (2006), Nakau (1991, 1998), Takeuchi (2013, 2015), Washio (1997)).

The reflexivity can best be represented at the level of conceptual structure in Conceptual Semantics (e.g. Culicover and Jackendoff (2005)). Examples of conceptual structure are given in (1b) and (2b). This particular level will and can represent the reflexivity in such a way that the reflexivity in the *have* constructions is fundamentally the same, and that the *have* constructions are manifestations of one *have*, although I will not propose any conceptual structure.<sup>2, 3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For this type of attempt, I refer the reader to, for example, Inoue (1995) and Takeuchi (2015).

<sup>3</sup> Within a different theoretical framework, Ritter and Rosen (1993, 1997) argue that there is only one *have*.

It has sometimes been argued that the verb *have* in English has no thematic or semantic roles to assign, and has little or no lexical meaning (e.g. Bach (1967), Ritter and Rosen (1993, 1997)). But, if so, the observations in (4) and (5) would be completely ungrounded; and why is it that there is a restriction regarding possible person pronouns in the PP, as in (7)? Sentence (5a) would not be equated with sentence (5b) (e.g. Brugman (1988: 47), McIntyre (2005: 419)); and sentences like (7) would contain any person pronoun. In the ensuing discussion, I will argue that this is indeed not the case.

The present paper is organized as follows: section 2 demonstrates that the subject argument of all the five *have* constructions bears a localist semantic role; section 3 illustrates that the verb *have* is associated with reflexivity; section 4 offers concluding remarks.

## 2. Subject argument bearing a localist semantic role

As briefly noted in section 1, the possessor argument of *belong* bears Location, and by analogy that of *have* bears Location as well. In the present study, we follow this argument (e.g. Jackendoff (2007: 213)).<sup>4</sup>

- (8) a. John has a house. (= (5a))  
 b. The house belongs to John. (= (5b))

Sentence (8a) instantiates possessive *have* (PH).

Similarly, the subject argument of existential *have* (EH) has been claimed to be a (human) location (e.g. Costa (1974), Culicover (2009), Jackendoff (1987)). For example, Jackendoff (1987: 382f.) observes that the subject of EH in (9) denotes the same referent as that of the complement of the preposition *in*, which assigns the Location role to its argument. It is thus assumed that the subject of EH bears Location as well, which we follow in the present study.<sup>5</sup>

- (9) The box<sub>i</sub> has books in it<sub>i</sub>. (Jackendoff (1987: 382), with modifications)

The subject argument of stative causative *have* (SCH) bears the Causer role. We call sentences like those in (10) and (11) SCH.<sup>6</sup> As Brugman (1988: 136) points out, the subject argument does not (intentionally) act on the complement in order for the situation denoted by the complement to happen. Thus, as she notes, the subject argument does not necessarily refer to an animate entity, as shown in the b-sentences in (10) and (11).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> For a slightly different approach, see, for example, Takeuchi (2015).

<sup>5</sup> For a (slightly) different approach, see, for example, Nakau (1998) and Takeuchi (2015).

<sup>6</sup> Brugman (1988) and McIntyre (2005) call them the Resultant State/Event and HAVE<sup>resp(onsibility)</sup>, respectively.

<sup>7</sup> I assume here that the semantic role borne by the subject argument of SCH is the same as that of the subject argument of the following double object constructions:

- (10) a. Well, now you have me curious. (*Iron Fist* 1-2, 29:02 left)  
b. This whole thing has me so rattled. (*Iron Fist* 1-2, 23:06 left)
- (11) a. Sally had Bill grinding his teeth in his sleep. (Brugman (1988: 136))  
b. Sally’s constant nagging had Bill grinding his teeth in his sleep.  
(Brugman (1988: 136))

Causer can be considered to be a localist semantic role. Elements that can introduce a Location argument can introduce a Causer argument. By analogy, Causer can be regarded as a localist semantic role as well. Observe the sentences in (12):

- (12) a. My brother lost his eyes in the war. (Nakau (2018: 27))  
b. Our fence blew over in the storm. (Nakau (2018: 29))  
c. The fence fell down in the wind. (Nakau (2018: 29))  
d. He lost his lecture notes in a fire. (Nakau (2018: 29))

Nakau (2018: 27ff.) notes that the preposition *in* in the sentences in (12) introduces a Location argument which is situated in time. He points out that *in the war* in (12a) means virtually the same as *during the war*. Losing eyes in the war, he continues, can safely be inferred to mean losing eyes because of the war, and the expression *because of* undoubtedly introduces a Causer argument. Thus, I argue, Causer can be regarded as a localist semantic role.

Another piece of evidence illustrating the localist nature of the Causer role comes from the fact that it can also be introduced by the preposition *from*, which introduces a Source argument, another localist argument (e.g. Clark and Carpenter (1989), Croft (1991)):

- (13) The window broke from the pressure. (Alexiadou and Doron (2012: 19))

Given that several elements introducing localist arguments can introduce Causer arguments, it seems reasonable to assume the localist nature of the Causer role.<sup>8</sup>

The reason for employing the term “stative” in “stative causative *have*” is that stative causative *have* or SCH can appear in the simple present tense, as illustrated in (10) and (14):<sup>9</sup>

- (14) a. @IrisVanRooij now you have me wanting to write on this myself.  
(@SimonDeDeo, Twitter 103020)

- 
- (i) a. The lighting here gives me a headache.  
b. Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book. (Oehrle (1976: 44))

<sup>8</sup> The following cross-linguistic fact can also work for the claim made here: in German, Causer can be introduced by the preposition *durch* (through) (Schäfer (2012: 161)); in Japanese, the particle or postposition *de* can introduce both Location and Causer (Nakau (2018: 25ff.)).

For the Causer role, see also Alexiadou and Schäfer (2006), Alexiadou et al. (2015), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 83f.), Pyllkkänen (2008: 93), Schäfer (2012), and Solstad (2009).

<sup>9</sup> See also McIntyre (2005: 417ff.).

b. We can't stop watching #The Favourite. Yorgos Lanthimos putting his own stamp on the royal drama has us very excited (as does crying, scheming Emma Stone) (@IndieWire, Twitter 071118)

c. Grandma has her wrestling opponent on the floor (McIntyre (2005: 418))

One piece of evidence that argues for the differentiation between SCH and eventive causative *have* (ECH) comes from the observation and claim made by Brugman (1988: 136). As illustrated in (15), the progressive morphology is only compatible with ECH:

(15) a. \* Sally was having Bill grinding his teeth in his sleep.

b. \* My jokes were having them rolling in the aisles.

c. \* I'm having him washing the dishes right now.

d. We were having the house surrounded by the National Guard.

(Brugman (1988: 136))

The data in (15) argues for the contention that SCH is stative and ECH is eventive, and that they should be treated differently.

Before discussing the semantic role of the subject argument of experiencer *have* and ECH, a brief note on the ambiguity of these two constructions is in order. As, for example, Nakau (1998) and McIntyre (2006) point out, experiencer *have* and ECH are, in principle, two possible interpretations of one and the same sentence or structure. For example, sentence (16) is two-way ambiguous:

(16) John had his hair cut. (Nakau (1998: 98))

It depends on the context in which the sentence is uttered in order for sentence (16) to get an experiencer interpretation or a causative one. The ambiguity is thus pragmatic, not grammatical.

The subject argument of experiencer *have* bears the Goal role; it is the goal of the eventuality denoted by the complement (e.g. Belvin and den Dikken (1997), Inoue (1995), Nakau (1998), Washio (1997)). Consider the data in (17):

(17) a. John<sub>i</sub> had a strange thing happen to him<sub>i</sub>. (Inoue (1995: 85))

b. \* John<sub>i</sub> had strange rumour spread from him<sub>i</sub>. (Inoue (1995: 85), [sic])

As shown in (17), the preposition *to* can appear or must appear, and the preposition *from* cannot. This fact indicates, Inoue (1995) argues, that the subject argument of experiencer *have* is the goal of the eventuality denoted by the complement and thus bears the Goal role.

I assume here that experiencers are mental or conceptual locations, that is, they are locatives (e.g. Landau (2010)). In South Asian Languages are found many different data illustrating the association between experiencers and goals/locations (Verma and Mohanan (1990)). Speas (1990) argues that the contrast in (18) in English illustrates the locative nature of experiencers:

(18) a. I tried to remember his name, but it wouldn't come to me.

- b. ?? I tried to write his name, but it wouldn't come to me.

(Speas (1990: 81))

The experiencer subject in (18a) functions as a goal toward which a theme moves; on the other hand, the non-experiencer subject in (18b) does not. The employment of the term “experiencer *have*” can thus be justified.

The subject argument of eventive causative *have* (ECH) bears Source. As illustrated in (19), which is presented by Givón (1975), ECH is compatible with adverbs like *deliberately*. The adverb in (19) indicates the existence of intention on the part of the subject referent.<sup>10, 11</sup> To put it differently, the appearance of an adverb of this kind in sentences like (19) disambiguates these sentences.

- (19) John had Mary pick up her books deliberately. (Givón (1975: 63))

As briefly noted in section 1, agentive subjects can be considered to be the intentional source of the activity denoted by the predicate (e.g. Gruber (1967), Nakau (1994)). Thus, the source arguments in (19) and (20) are compatible with agentivity.<sup>12</sup>

- (20) John lost the game intentionally. (= (3a))

The ambiguity between experiencer *have* and ECH can then be reduced to be the choice of the semantic role that the subject argument bears (cf. Inoue (1995), Nakau (1998)). When the subject argument bears Goal, sentence (16) instantiates experiencer *have*; when it bears Source, sentence (16) instantiates ECH. This argument will be slightly revised in the next section.

In sum, the subject argument of each and every *have* construction that we deal with here bears a localist semantic role.

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<sup>10</sup> ECH can occur in imperative clauses, which can be another diagnostics for predicates to be agentive:

- (i) a. Have Mary lock the door.  
b. Have a car parked outside the bank, so you can make a quick getaway.  
(Dieterich (1975: 165))

<sup>11</sup> As for sentences like (19), Schäfer (2012: 154) reports that agentive adverbs can only modify the surface object argument. I continue the discussion here on the basis of Givón's observation.

<sup>12</sup> Following Holisky (1987), Nakau (1994), Takeuchi (2019), and Van Valin and Wilkins (1996), I assume here that Agent is a pragmatic concept that overlays another argument. Nakau (1994) argues that Agent is conceptually compatible not with Goal but with Source. Since the ambiguity between experiencer *have* and ECH is pragmatic, not grammatical, it is consonant with the assumption of Agent being pragmatic. For the ambiguity between the two constructions, see also section 3.

### 3. Reflexivity

All the five *have* constructions encode reflexivity, which is, in principle, conceptual. This means that there is no need for a morphological element establishing it to appear in the complement (e.g. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), Nakau (1991, 1998), Takeuchi (2013, 2015), Washio (1997)).

Possessive *have* (PH) encodes reflexivity. According to Takeuchi (2015), PH specifies that the surface object is referentially dependent on the surface subject; in other words, the referent of the surface object is determined in relation to the surface subject. When, for example, the object refers to a thing like a car or house and the subject refers to a human being, as in (21a), the car or house is thought of as the human being's car or house. Similarly, as in (21b), when a relational noun appears in object position, its referent is determined in relation to the subject referent.<sup>13</sup>

- (21) a. John has a house.  
b. John has a wife.

The reflexivity demonstrated by PH can be more clearly understood by looking at other verbs that do not have this particular characteristic. Observe (22):

- (22) John knows a {house / wife}. (Takeuchi (2015: 48))

Sentence (22) does not refer to situations where the referents of the object arguments are determined in relation to the subject. In fact, English native speakers have some difficulty in interpreting sentences like (22). The data in (21) and (22) indicate that PH encodes the reflexive relation between the subject and object arguments.

Existential *have* (EH) encodes reflexivity as well (e.g. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), Harley (1997), Nakau (1991), Takeuchi (2013, 2015)). As illustrated in (23), the PP in EH cannot contain a pronoun referring to an entity other than the subject referent (e.g. Nakau (1991: 337)). On the other hand, the sentences (24), with the verb *put* or *hide*, do not exhibit such a constraint.

- (23) a. She<sub>i</sub> has a hole in {her<sub>i</sub> / \*his} shirt. (cf. Nakau (1991: 341))  
b. The box<sub>i</sub> has books in {it<sub>i</sub> / \*them / \*the room}. (Nakau (1991: 337))  
(24) a. She<sub>i</sub> put a magazine on {her<sub>i</sub> / his / their} sofa. (Takeuchi (2015: 55))  
b. She<sub>i</sub> hid a DVD under {her<sub>i</sub> / his / their} bed. (Takeuchi (2015: 55))

Furthermore, the reflexivity exhibited by EH is, in principle, conceptual (e.g. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), Nakau (1991, 1998), Takeuchi (2013, 2015), Washio (1997)). For example, sentence (25a), a generic sentence, can be regarded as an instance of EH where the PP *around here* is thought of as referring to the area where the subject referents

<sup>13</sup> See also de Jong (1987: 280).

inhabit (Langacker (1995: 73)). Sentence (25a) is reflexive as well, in that the referent of the PP is determined in relation to the referents of the subject argument.

- (25) a. We have a lot of coyotes around here. (Langacker (1995: 73))  
b. \* We (=Americans) have a lot of coyotes around here (=in Japan).  
(Takeuchi (2013: 213))

As Takeuchi (2013) points out, when the subject and the PP are not related with each other conceptually, the sentence is not licensed as an instance of EH. In (25b), the subject and the PP respectively denote Americans and Japan. Since there is no conceptual relation between the two, sentence (25b) is not licensed as an instance of EH.

Stative causative *have* (SCH) encodes reflexivity as well. Brugman (1988: 137) notes that sentence (26) has one reading where the Agent of the embedded eventuality corefers to the subject of the matrix clause, which bears the Causer role.<sup>14</sup>

(26) We had the house surrounded in a matter of minutes. (Brugman (1988: 136))  
Since the subject argument of SCH is not an intentional agent but only a cause of the eventuality denoted by the complement, SCH is, she assumes, compatible with self-directed causation.

The observation by Brugman is supported by Belvin (1993). Belvin (1993: 69) points out that the a-sentences in (27) and (28) are interpreted as the b-sentences in (27) and (28), respectively, without any “substantial change in meaning”.

- (27) a. The ice had the car sliding around. (Belvin (1993: 69))  
b. The ice<sub>i</sub> had the car sliding around on it<sub>i</sub>. (Belvin (1993: 69))  
(28) a. The music had Bill tapping his foot. (Belvin (1993: 69))  
b. The music<sub>i</sub> had Bill tapping his foot to it<sub>i</sub>. (Belvin (1993: 69))

Thus, it seems reasonable to say that SCH encodes reflexivity as well.

The observation just mentioned indicates that no morphological form is necessary, at least superficially, in order to establish a reflexive relation in SCH.

It has been well known that experiencer *have* encodes reflexivity as well (e.g. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), Harley (1997), Nakau (1991, 1998), Takeuchi (2013), Ritter and Rosen (1997), Washio (1997)); in other words, there has to be a link between the subject and the complement, which Belvin and den Dikken (1997) call “the link requirement”.

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<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, she points out, sentence (ia), an example of ECH, does not have this reading, indicating that sentence (ia) can only be interpreted as sentences like (ib).

- (i) a. We were having the house surrounded.  
b. We were having the house surrounded by the National Guard.  
(Brugman (1988: 136))

Consider the sentences in (29):

- (29) a. She<sub>i</sub> had her<sub>i</sub> camera confiscated by the police. (Washio (1997: 51))  
 b. John<sub>i</sub> had his<sub>i</sub> car break down. (Inoue (1995: 73))

In each of the sentences in (29), there is a person pronoun referring back to the subject argument.

The link requirement is not formal or morphological but conceptual (e.g. Belvin (1993), Belvin and den Dikken (1997), McIntyre (2006), Nakau (1991, 1998), Takeuchi (2013), Washio (1997)). This fact is illustrated in (30):

- (30) Poor Mr. Chips. He had students walk out of class today. (Harley (1997: 78))

The conceptual nature of the link requirement is also supported or validated by the observation and data presented by McIntyre (2006):

- (31) When the director got to Cuthbert's house, where the film was to be shot, he was furious. The film crew were late, the main actor was stoned, and to add insult to injury, he [=the director] had Gwendoline's car on Cuthbert's driveway with the keys locked in it, although he'd wanted it on the street.

(McIntyre (2006: 190), underline added)

As illustrated in (30) and (31), even when no element in the complement refers back to the subject referent, a *have* sentence can instantiate experiencer *have*.

Some may argue that experiencer *have* and ECH differ in the direction of affectedness (e.g. Hayase (2000), Nakau (1998)). That is to say, in experiencer *have*, the subject argument is affected by the eventuality denoted by the complement; on the other hand, in ECH, the subject argument affects the eventuality denoted by the complement. The difference in the direction of affectedness is sometimes schematically shown like the following:

- (32) a. experiencer *have*: Person ← event  
 b. eventive causative *have*: Person → event

(e.g. Hayase (2000: 8), Nakau (1998: 98))

However, as Inoue (1995) claims, the subject argument of ECH bears Goal as well.

Surprising as it may sound, from a localist point of view, ECH does encode reflexivity. In other words, it is not until ECH is examined or investigated within a localist approach that the reflexivity associated with it is clarified. By doing so, we will slightly revise the claim made previously that the subject argument of ECH bears Source. In fact, it bears both Source and Goal simultaneously. The ambiguity between experiencer *have* and ECH can then be reduced to be the choice between Goal only and not only Source but also Goal on the part of the subject argument. As we see below, the Source argument of ECH arranges for the event denoted by the

complement to happen, and the event is directed to the subject argument. This results in the subject argument bearing both Source and Goal.

Since Source is the exact contrary to Goal, the duality of the subject argument may make ECH look unique or exceptional in a localist theory. But given the fact that the other four *have* constructions all exhibit a reflexive meaning, it should not be surprising for ECH to encode a reflexive meaning as well.<sup>15</sup>

Inoue (1995) presents many different pieces of evidence arguing for the duality. Let us take a look at some of them here. Syntactically speaking, the person pronoun *his* in (31) should refer to either *John* or *Bill*. But the two sentences differ in which interpretation is primary:

- (33) a.        **John**<sub>i</sub> had Bill<sub>j</sub> wash **his**<sub>i/j</sub> dishes.                    (Inoue (1995: 89), bold added)  
      b.        John<sub>i</sub> made **Bill**<sub>j</sub> wash **his**<sub>i/j</sub> dishes.                    (Inoue (1995: 89), bold added)

In (33a), the primary interpretation is that the pronoun refers back to the subject referent; on the other hand, in (33b), it is that the pronoun refers to the surface object referent.

The difference in acceptability in (34), Inoue argues, can be accounted for by assuming that the subject argument of ECH is the goal of the eventuality denoted by the complement.

- (34) a.    \*        John had himself wash the car.                    (Inoue (1995: 88))  
      b.        John had himself washed.                    (Inoue (1995: 88))

It is odd to say that the subject referent makes himself be the goal of his own action of washing a car. According to Inoue (1995: 88), “such a roundabout way of speaking” is not allowed in natural languages, where “John washed the car himself” or “John washed the car for his own benefit” can express one and the same situation much more easily. On the other hand, there is no oddity in expressing a situation where the subject referent makes himself be the goal of the action of someone else washing his body, as in (34b).

The same reasoning can apply to the sentences in (35). In (35a), the person who feels the subject referent’s power is the subject referent himself; on the other hand, in (35b), it is the voter(s) and/or people surrounding him. Sentence (35a) describes a situation in which the subject referent arranged that he himself felt his own power with the help of someone else’s, leading to the oddity.<sup>16</sup>

- (35) a.    \*        The candidate<sub>i</sub> had his<sub>i</sub> power felt.                    (Inoue (1995: 89))  
      b.        The candidate<sub>i</sub> made his<sub>i</sub> power felt.                    (Inoue (1995: 89))

There is a restriction regarding possible past participle complements in ECH. Past

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<sup>15</sup> It is left for future research whether or not this duality can be indeed justified within a localist approach.

<sup>16</sup> The verb *get* behaves the same as *have*:

- (i)        \*        The candidate<sub>i</sub> got his<sub>i</sub> power felt.                    (Inoue (1995: 89, fn. 8))

participles whose (hidden) subject argument bears Source can head the complement of ECH, while past participles whose (hidden) subject argument bears Goal cannot (cf. McIntyre (2006)). Observe (36) and (37):

- |      |       |                                     |                    |
|------|-------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|
| (36) | a.    | John had a lot of money donated.    | (Inoue (1995: 91)) |
|      | b. *  | John had a lot of money inherited.  | (Inoue (1995: 91)) |
|      | c. *  | John had some estate acquired.      | (Inoue (1995: 91)) |
|      | d. ?* | John had a lot of money obtained.   | (Inoue (1995: 91)) |
| (37) | a.    | Mary had a precious diamond sold.   | (Inoue (1995: 90)) |
|      | b. ?* | Mary had a precious diamond bought. | (Inoue (1995: 90)) |

The verbs *donate* and *sell* assign Source to their subject argument; on the other hand, the verbs *inherit*, *acquire*, *obtain*, and *buy* assign Goal to their subject argument. Sentence (36a), for example, describes a situation in which the subject referent arranged an event of someone else donating a lot of money to him. Thus, from a localist point of view, it is clear that ECH is associated with reflexivity as well.

In sum, each and every *have* construction that we have investigated here encodes reflexivity.

#### 4. Conclusion

This paper has argued for the inclusion of *have* in the category of localist verbs and for the existence of the same lexical meaning in all the five constructions dealt with here. Specifically, the present study has claimed that each and every *have* construction assigns a localist semantic role or roles to its subject argument and encodes reflexivity. The reflexivity associated with eventive causative *have* (ECH) (and perhaps experiencer *have*), in particular, can best be clarified within a localist approach (Inoue (1995)). This is another argument for a localist approach to *have*.

One of the underlying proposals has been that the five constructions are manifestations of one *have* (cf. Ritter and Rosen (1993, 1997)). Given the fact that the other four *have* constructions all encode reflexivity, that ECH encodes it as well should not be surprising.

Last but not least, examining the HAVE relation in English (and German), McIntyre (2006) claims that *have*, *get*, and *with(out)* all instantiate one and the same functional category. In other words, they all, he claims, instantiate one underspecified element. The account presented in this paper may lead to the better understanding of those phenomena that are probably related with each other.

#### Acknowledgments

This paper is a revised and extended version of presentations given at Fukuoka Cognitive

Linguistics Society on September 11th, 2017 and at Fukuoka Linguistic Circle (FLC) on April 21st, 2018. Many thanks go to those who attended the sessions. Many thanks also go to those who kindly acted as informants. I also thank two reviewers for comments and suggestions. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 19K13229.

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